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Delgamuukw and the Protection of Aboriginal Land
Interests
Gordon Christie*
Afin de ddterminer la nature du
contr6le dontjouissent les ddtenteurs
du titre autochtone sur les domaines
autochtones, il faut examiner la
doctrine de fiducie, car c 'est
l'application de cette doctrine en
matire des violations ldgislatives qui
sert a 6tablir les limites dans
lesquelles les ddtenteurs du titre
autochtone peuvent s'attendre au
respect de leurs droits. D a n s
l 'affaire Delgamuukw, la Cour
supreme du Canada a adopt6 et
appliqug son interprdtation de la
relation fiduciaire entre la Couronne
et les Autochtones 6noncie dans
l'affaire Gladstone. Ce faisant, la
Cour supreme a defini le pouvoir des
gouvernements canadiens de contr6ler
l'usage qui peut otre fait des terres
ddtenues en vertu du titre autochtone.
Ironiquement, la Cour ayant ddcrit le
titre autochtone comme itant de
nature exclusive, l'application de la
r~gle 9noncge dans l 'arr~t Gladstone
augmente le pouvoir de la Couronne
defagon importante. Cela a mend i la
crdation de la notionjuridique de titre
autochtone, laquelle semble i
premiere ue tr~sprometteusepour les
peuples autochtones qui cherchent i
se conformer ei leurs responsabilitis
sacrges envers leurs terres. En rjalitg,
To determine the extent to which
Aboriginal title-holders enjoy control
over Aboriginal title lands, it is
necessary to explorefiduciary doctrine,
for the application of this doctrine to
the question oflegislative infringement
determines the limits within which
Aboriginal title-holders can expect to
see their interests respected. In
Delgamuukw the Supreme Court
Canada adopted and applied an
understanding of the Crown-
Aboriginal fiduciary relationship it
developed in Gladstone. In so doing
the Supreme Court set out the power of
Canadian governments to control the
uses to which Aboriginal title lands can
be put. Ironically, sinceAboriginal title
is characterized by the Court as
exclusive in nature, the application of
the Gladstone position significantly
enhances the power of the Crown. The
result is the creation of a judicial
concept of Aboriginal title which on
first reading might appear to hold out
much promise to Aboriginal peoples
struggling to meet sacred
responsibilities vis-i-vis their lands,
but which is actually impotent to slow
the exploitation of.Aboriginal lands by
Canadian governments and third
parties acting under authority of
Canadian governments. Clearly, then,
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par contre, elle n 'est d'aucune utilitj
pour ralentir l'exploitation des terres
autochtones par les gouvernements
canadiens et les tierces parties
agissant pour le compte des
gouvernements canadiens. De toute
6vidence, il faut donc voir 1'arr~t
Delgamuukw comme un instrument
juridique qui sert i poursuivre les
efforts d'assimilation des peuples
autochtones dans le courant principal
de la socigtg canadienne.
Delgamuukwv must be understood as a
legal tool employed in continuing
efforts to assimilate Aboriginalpeoples
into mainstream Canadian society.
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ABORIGINAL LAND INTERESTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,' the Supreme Court of Canada offered
guidance to Canadian courts on a variety ofjudicially unresolved matters concerning the
nature of Aboriginal title.2 While the general nature of Aboriginal rights had been
circumscribed in Van der Peet,3 Aboriginal rights in relation to lands traditionally
occupied by Aboriginal peoples had not been clarified. Delgamuukw, a case which in
lower courts had already assumed legendary status, 4 offered an opportunity to settle
questions about the general legal nature of Aboriginal interests in Aboriginal lands.
On a general plane of abstraction, it can be said that Aboriginal peoples share
a vision of their lands and their relationships to these lands (so long as it is borne in
mind that the details of the structures built out of the shared conceptual base differ from
region to region). This shared vision can be expounded in terms of spiritual connections
to those lands Aboriginal peoples see as placed in their care by the Creator; spiritual
connections spelled out in terms ofsacred responsibilities.' Conditions conducive to the
t[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Delgamuukw cited to
S.C.R.].
2 In the early seminal decision, St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. R. (1888),
14 App. Cas. 46 at 54 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catherine's Milling], the Privy Council held that
Aboriginal title was a "personal and usufructuary right". As Lamer C.J. noted in Delgamuukw,
supra note 1 at 1083, the court then "declined to explain what that meant because it was not
'necessary to express any opinion upon the point' (at p.55)". Lamer went on to point out that:
"[s]imilarly, in Calder(Calderv. British Columbia (A. G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313,34 D.L.R. (3d) 145
[hereinafter Calder cited to S.C.R.]), Guerin (Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R 335, 13 D.L.R. (4d)
321 [hereinafter Guerin cited to S.C.R.]), and Paul (Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 654, 53 D.L.R. (4") 487 [hereinafter Paul cited to S.C.R.]), the issues were the
extinguishment of, the fiduciary duty arising from the surrender of, and statutory easements over
land held pursuant to, [A]boriginal title, respectively; the content of title was not at issue and was
not directly addressed." Apart from this apparent reluctance to define the content of Aboriginal
title, the courts devised a test to determine the validity of a claim to title in Baker Lake (Hamlet)
v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (T.D.),
[ 1980] 5 W.W.R. 193 [hereinafter BakerLake cited to F.C.]. They set out a test for the legitimate
infringement ofAboriginal rights by the Crown inR. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R.
(4e) 385 [hereinafter Sparrow cited to S.C.R.], modified this test somewhat in R. v. Gladstone,
[ 1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, 137 D.L.R. (4) 648 [hereinafter Gladstone cited to S.C.R.], and laid out the
nature ofAboriginal rights in general inR. v. Van derPeet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 137 D.L.R. (4e)
289 [hereinafter Van der Peet cited to S.C.R.]. Since the Supreme Court had put some distance
between Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title in R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 138 D.L.R.
(41) 657 [hereinafter Adams cited to S.C.R.], the nature of title remained to be determined.
3 Van der Peet, supra note 2.
4 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4"') 185, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97
(B.C.S.C.); Delgamuukwv. British Columbia (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4t ) 470, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 97
(B.C.C.A.). The trial judgment, in particular, received a notorious standing, as criticism from a
multidisciplinary front fell on MacEachem J.'s ruling. See e.g. F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title
in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books, 1992), and
D. Culhane, The Pleasure of the Crown: Anthropology, Law and First Nations (Burnaby:
Talonbooks, 1998).
5 Included below are a small sample drawn from the now fairly prolific and widely
disseminated statements and tracts attesting to this generally held perception of the nature of land,
and the relationships between Aboriginal peoples and their lands:
1. Statement of the Gitwangak Chiefs, quoted in Skanu'u (A. Wilson) and
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protection of these Aboriginal interests in Aboriginal land--interests culled from the
perspective Aboriginal peoples bring to this issue--are not difficult to determine. The
rightful authority of Aboriginal peoples to "govern" their lands should be
D. Monet, Colonialism on Trial: Indigenous LandRights and the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en Sovereignty Case (Philadelphia: New Society Publishing, 1992)
at 1: "We hold these lands by the best of all titles. We have received them
as a gift from the Creator to our Grandmothers and Grandfathers, and we
believe that we cannot be deprived of them by anything short of direct
injustice."
2. Statement of Hopi Religious Leaders, as quoted in P. Knudtson & D.
Suzuki, Wisdom of the Elders (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1992) at 137:
"This land was granted to the Hopi by a power greater than man can
explain....The land is sacred and if the land is abused, the sacredness of Hopi
life will disappear and all other life as well....The Hopi were given special
guidance in caring for our sacred lands so as not to disrupt the fragile
harmony that holds things together....We received these lands from the Great
Spirit and we must hold them for him, as a steward, a caretaker, until he
returns."
3. G. Cajete, "Ensoulment of Nature" in A. Hirschfelder, ed., Native
Heritage: PersonalAccounts by.American Indians, 1790 to the Present (New
York: Macmillan, 1995) at 55-57: "Traditionally, Indian people have
expressed in multiple ways that their land and the maintenance of its
ecological integrity is key to their physical and cultural survival....Indian
people expressed a relationship to the natural world that can only be called
ensoulment....This projection of the human sense of soul...has been called
'participation mystique'....It is from this orientation that Indian people
believed that they had responsibilities to the land and to all living things,
similar to those which they had to each other....They understood themselves
as literally born of the earth of their Place....This was the ultimate
identification of being indigenous to a place and forms the basis for a fully
internalized bonding with Place....The disconnection of that kinship can lead
to a deep split in the inner and outer consciousness of the individual and
group....which can ultimately only be healed through re-establishing the
meaningful ties to the land that have been lost. Reconnecting with nature and
its inherent meaning is an essential healing and transformational process for
Indian people."
An attempt to provide an overview ofa generalized Aboriginal conception ofAboriginal
title is offered by Leroy Little Bear in "Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian 'Grundnorm' in J.R.
Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians andDecolonization (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1986) at 243.
The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples also provides valuable
insights into Aboriginal peoples' conceptions of land and their interrelationships with it. See
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Communications
Group, 1996) (Co-chairs: R. Dussault & G. Erasmus) [hereinafterRCAP]. One key point linking
together the varied conceptions is that the granting of lands by the Creator is never conceived of
as absolute. Rather, there is at least one general condition on the granting, namely that the
Aboriginal grantees maintain and respect their sense of responsibilities toward not only their
immediate community, but to past and future generations, and to all other inhabitants of the lands,
plant, animal and otherwise.
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acknowledged,6 and the power to do so placed in their hands. This would enable
Aboriginal peoples to circle back to the task of fulfilling their responsibilities.
We might expect that the Supreme Court would struggle to integrate the
Aboriginal vision of land "title" into Canadian law, trying to bridge the gap between the
dominant legal system and the interests of the colonized and dispossessed.
Unfortunately, the legal creature known as "Aboriginal title"7 (rising out of the Court's
reasoning in Delgamuukw) seems to have very little to do with Aboriginal visions of
land title, and everything to do with accelerating the integration (and disappearance) of
Aboriginal peoples into Canadian society.
When we consider that Aboriginal peoples can only hope to meet their
responsibilities vis-a-vis the stewardship of their lands when they enjoy a sufficient
degree of control over the uses to which these lands are put, it is clear that the key
question in examining Delgamuukw is the extent to which the judgment moves the law
along on a path toward reinitiating Aboriginal land control. This demands that we move
beyond the description of the nature of Aboriginal title offered by the Court, for this tells
us little more than how the Court conceives the nature of the relationship between
Aboriginal title-holders and their lands. What we need to focus on is the question of the
extent to which the Court upholds the ability of the title-holders to control the uses to
which their lands are put. As we will find, however, resolving this question requires that
we examine the extent to which the Court upholds the power of Canadian governments
to control these very same lands. What emerges from an examination of both the nature
of Aboriginal title and the respective powers of Aboriginal peoples and Canadian
governments vis-ai-vis Aboriginal lands is a picture of a judicially determined creation
which is described so as to appear quite powerful, but which is severely restricted if
exercised by Aboriginal title-holders.
We turn, then, to certain features of Aboriginal title. These are the features
which both (a) describe the sorts of power Aboriginal title-holders ought to be able to
exercise, and (b) determine the sort of control over traditional territory that Aboriginal
land-owners are actually accorded. The combination of these features determines the
extent to which Aboriginal peoples will be able to revitalize, under current Canadian
law, their relations to the land and its spirits.
II. THENATURE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
A. A Right to Land
In spelling out the content of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.
concluded the following:
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the right to engage
in specific activities which may be themselves [A]boriginal rights. Rather,
6 It may be problematic to employ the term "govern" if this carries with it certain Euro-
Canadian overtones (such as notions of dominance and majority rule). See T. Alfred, Peace,
Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press,
1999) at 24-29.
7 Henceforth this term will denote the conceptualization of Aboriginal interests in
Aboriginal lands developed by the Supreme Court, in distinction from those conceptualizations
Aboriginal peoples might provide.
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it confers the right to use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need
be aspects of practices, customs and traditions which are integral to the
distinctive cultures of [A]boriginal societies!s
In Van der Peet,9 the Supreme Court tied Aboriginal rights to the traditional
practices and customs of the people in question. In making this determination
concerning Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J. struck out on a different conceptual path, for
allowance was made for Aboriginal rights not tethered to "aspects of practices, customs
and traditions....integral to the distinctive cultures of aboriginal societies.'"
Over the last few decades, the judiciary has come to see itself as protecting the
interests of Aboriginal peoples as Aboriginal peoples. This is the doctrine of
"Aboriginality," the protection of various essences of diverse Aboriginal cultures as
expressed through their historic practices and customs. In Van der Peet, for example,
Lamer C.J. laid down a fundamental understanding of the nature of constitutionally
protected Aboriginal rights, saying that they are known as Aboriginal rights precisely
because the aim has been to constitutionally protect Aboriginal peoples as Aboriginal
peoples, something only made possible with the protection of particularly Aboriginal
practices and the like.1'
A number of commentators have criticized this approach to Aboriginal rights
on the basis that it "freezes" Aboriginal peoples in the past, forcing them to show how
they exhibit today the same cultural practices and traditions that existed at the time of
contact.'2 Only if Aboriginal people live up to a standard of Aboriginality grounded in
historic practices and customs are they able to assert Aboriginal rights. Besides trapping
Aboriginal communities in constructs based on centuries-old customs and traditions, this
' Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1080. That this does not amount to some form of
inalienable fee simple estate will be made clear as the full content of Aboriginal title is revealed.
9 Van der Peet, supra note 2.
" Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1080. In discussing how the dialogue between the
courts and the legislatures plays a major role in determining the direction that jurisprudence on
Aboriginal law takes, Jonathan Rudin noted that Delgamuukw (as Sparrow had earlier, though in
a different context) set out on a new jurisprudential path. See J. Rudin, "One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back: The Political and Institutional Dynamics Behind the Supreme Court of Canada's
Decisions in R. v. Sparrow, R. v. Van der Peet and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1998) 13
J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 67 at 90.
" See Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 534: "[A]boriginal rights must be viewed
differently from Charter rights because they are rights held only by [A]boriginal members of
Canadian society. They arise from the fact that [A]boriginal people are [Alboriginar' (emphasis
in original). And later at 548: "[t]he test for identifying the [A]boriginal rights recognized and
affirmed by s.35 (1) must....aim at identifying the practices, traditions and customs central to the
[A]boriginal societies that existed in North America prior to contact with the Europeans."
2 See e.g. J. Borrows, "Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the
Trickster" (1997) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37 [hereinafter "Frozen Rights"]; K. McNeil,
"Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" (1998) 5 Tulsa J.
of Comp. & Int'l Law 253 [hereinafter "Territorial Sovereignty"]; R. L. Barsh & J. Y. Henderson,
"The Supreme Court's Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) 42
McGill L. J. 993.
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doctrine also acts to oppress Aboriginal peoples, forcing them to either live according
to standards imposed by the courts or lose their historic claims. 3
The finding that Aboriginal title constitutes a "right to land" would seem to
move away from this protectionist (and paternalistic) doctrine. The Court has taken a
step away from the general approach to Aboriginal rights in acknowledging uses of the
land as Aboriginal, when falling under Aboriginal title, even when they are not tied to
historic uses.
14
Nevertheless, while it is vital to understanding the nature of Aboriginal title,
the impact of the new "right to land" direction for Aboriginal title must be measured
against other elements that go into its sui generis nature as defined by the Supreme
Court.'5 Otherwise one might imagine that Aboriginal peoples have been accorded the
sort of title which could enable them, as landowners, to renew traditional lives and to
3 This criticism, which I endorse, is consistent with the claim that since Aboriginal
peoples can only reconnect with their age-old responsibilities if control of their lands is placed in
their hands, this must be the aim of Canadian law. The argument against "freezing" Aboriginal
people and their rights is (a) aimed at practices, not principles or beliefs; and (b) points to
instances of colonialism, wherein Euro-Canadian courts determine the parameters of the issue at
hand, the mechanisms for finding and validating facts, the nature of the impugned rights, and even
the very conceptual framework within which all this takes place. The call for reinvigoration of
Aboriginal land control, on the other hand, emanates from within Aboriginal communities, and
is not directed toward particular physical uses of the land, but at enabling the continuation and
strengthening of sacred connections to the land.
14 Exploring the Court's discussion of the nature of the Crown's fiduciary duties to
Aboriginal title-holders reveals thatprotecting Aboriginal societies as Aboriginal societies-even
from themselves-is still an underlying theme in Aboriginal title, as this concept is developed in
Delgamuukw. See Section III, below, for more on this topic.
15 That Aboriginal title is suigeneris in nature has been an explicit tenet of Canadian
law since Dickson J. concluded in Guerin, supra note 2 at 382 that "in describing what constitutes
a unique interest in land the courts have almost inevitably found themselves applying a somewhat
inappropriate terminology drawn from general property law." In light of this inappropriateness,
Dickson J. characterized the Indian interest in land as sui generis a few lines later. This line of
reasoning was carried forward in Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1112 where Dickson J. and La Forest
J. held that "[]ourts must be careful....to avoid the application of traditional common law
concepts of property as they develop their understanding of... .the 'sui generis' nature of
(A]boriginal rights."
InDelgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1081, Lamer C.J. held that: "Aboriginal title has been
described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from 'normal' proprietary interests, such as fee
simple." This aspect of Aboriginal title, which might seem to grant a license to the Supreme
Court to invent doctrine, will come back into the discussion later, when we explore the proof
requirements set out in Delgamuukw.
William F. Flanagan challenges the theoretical underpinning of the Court's use of the
sui generis designation in his article "Piercing the Veil of Real Property Law: Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia" (1998) 24 Queen's L.J. 279. Acknowledging that there may be reason to
"pierce the veil," Flanagan notes at 283-285 the danger of labeling a new legal concept as sui
generis: "as is the case in corporate law, whenever a court asserts such a broad jurisdiction to
disregard established legal doctrine in order to achieve what is perceived as an equitable result,
it is entering uncharted waters." In the context of Delgamuukw, the concern becomes "whether
'piercing the veil' in this case is an elaborate device to restrict the scope of [A]boriginal title,
rather than a culturally sensitive approach that recognizes that 'formalistic' and 'alien' principles
of property lav should not be applied to [A]boriginal title." (emphasis in original)
2000-2001]
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legally challenge much of the resource exploitation currently devastating their
traditional territories.
We begin with some features of Aboriginal title that seem to strengthen the
nature of the Aboriginal right to land. This is followed by an exploration into the
Court's discussion of the power of the Crown to infringe Aboriginal title, a discussion
which reveals the true power accorded Aboriginal title-holders.
B. Exclusivity
The court in Delgamuukw made a number of fairly unremarkable findings16 in
conjunction with several more interesting determinations. Aboriginal title was found
to be a collective or communal right, not an interest grounded in the rightful claims of
individual Aboriginal people. This has long been a common law understanding of
Aboriginal claims to land.17 Aboriginal title was also found to be inalienable, except to
the Crown. This also is no surprise, and has underscored Crown dealings with issues
of Aboriginal claims to land at the very least since the Royal Proclamation. 8
In finding a right to land itself, however, the court also found an exclusivity of
ownership absent from earlier decisions on Aboriginal title.' 9 On numerous occasions,
Canadian courts had held that valid Aboriginal claims to land amounted to rights to use
and occupy certain tracts.20 To elevate these rights to the status of rights to the exclusive
use and occupation of the land must certainly add an element that transforms the
judiciaries' understanding of the nature of Aboriginal title.
It might seem a fairly natural approach to unpacking what this element adds to
the concept of Aboriginal title to suppose that the term means basically what it means
in other property contexts. Exclusivity, then, would entail a particular sort of
ownership, for when a right of this nature is acknowledged, the party with an interest
in the land not only has the right to enjoy the land and its fruits, but also, to some
degree, the ability to determine how, if at all, others will do likewise.
16 "Unremarkable" in this context is measured against jurisprudence on Aboriginal
title, as it existed up to this point, and is certainly not meant to suggest that these determinations
are, in themselves, unremarkable.
17 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1082: "A further dimension of [A]boriginal title is the
fact that it is held communally. Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons;
it is a collective right to land held by all members of an [A]boriginal nation."
18 Royal Proclamation of 7 October, 1763, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1:
We do, with the advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private
Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved
to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies where, We have thought proper
to allow Settlement; but that, if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined
to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name.
19 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1083: "[T]he content of [A]boriginal title can be
summarized by two propositions: first, that [A]boriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive
use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not
be aspects of those [A]boriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive
[A]boriginal cultures." The second proposition concerns an "inherent limit" to Aboriginal title,
not discussed in this work.
20 See e.g. St. Catherines yMilling, supra note 2; Calder, supra note 2; Guerin, supra
note 2; Van der Peet, supra note 2.
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Exclusivity would seem, then, to entail a significant degree of control,
including, as Kent McNeil points out, "as much right as any other landholder to prevent
others-and this includes governments-from intruding on and using their lands without
their consent.",21 This would appear to be a powerful newly "discovered" feature of
Aboriginal title. This would also seem to entail a feature which appears later in the
judgment, as Lamer C.J. takes note of several characteristics of Aboriginal title that go
into determining the particular form and content of the fiduciary duty that the Crown
will fall under in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples vis-a-vis their land: "[A]boriginal
title encompasses the right to choose to what uses land can be put.
22
Exclusivity of Aboriginal title would appear to be further strengthened when
the place of this right in the Constitutional scheme is brought to mind: "Indeed," McNeil
continues, "[Aboriginal title-holders] should have even greater protection against
government intrusion than other landholders because their Aboriginal rights have been
recognized and affirmed by the Constitution, whereas the property rights of other
landholders have not."'
This form of exclusivity is, however, a very odd creature. It would seem to
make sense to say that it entails a significant degree of control, and that it is enhanced
in light of the constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights. But when we look to the "cash
value" of exclusivity in this context (a task to be undertaken in detail in the next part of
this work)24 we find the ledger strangely depleted. Aboriginal peoples would not seem
entitled to buy a "no trespassing" sign, let alone entitled to enforce a "significant"
degree of control over their lands.
Granted the suigeneris status of Aboriginal title25 seems to give free rein to the
Court to construct whatever peculiar vision seems appropriate in its eyes. If anything,
however, this only heightens the air of mystery hanging over a form of title which,
though seemingly powerful, is actually quite impotent. To appreciate this mystery, we
must look to how the Court has spelled out the power of the Crown in relation to
Aboriginal title lands.
Ill. INFRINGEMENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
2' K. McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90's: Has the Supreme Court Finally
Got it Right? (Toronto: Roberts Centre for Canadian Studies, 1998) at 11 [hereinafter Defining
Aboriginal Title]. It must be kept in mind that a common landowner, lacking the radical or
underlying title vested in the Crown (not being a sovereign power), can find his or her consent
ignored or over-ridden in certain clearly defined situations.
22 Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1111 (emphasis in original). A few paragraphs later
Lamer C.J. repeats at 1113 that: "[A]boriginal title encompasses within it a right to choose to
what ends a piece of land can be put." While exclusivity and the right to choose ends are
presented as separate aspects of Aboriginal title in these paragraphs, the latter must issue from the
former, for no mention is made of the right to choose ends when the court presents its definition
of Aboriginal title.
2 Defining Aboriginal Title, supra note 21 at 11. McNeil goes on to point out that this
feature does not seem to be given the weight it should by the Supreme Court, for later in
Delgamuukw the court lays down the law concerning the infringement of Aboriginal title,
presenting a picture of legitimate infringement which would not seem applicable to common
landholders' interests. This is discussed more fully later in this paper.
24 See, in particular, the discussion of fiduciary doctrine as it applies to the Crown's
interaction with Aboriginal title.
2 See supra note 15 for a discussion of the sui generis nature of Aboriginal title.
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A. The Power of the Crown
To explore the power of the Crown in relation to Aboriginal lands, we need to
consider remarks coming at the end of the judgment, as the Court turned to the question
of legislative infringement ofAboriginal title. While these latter remarks do not purport
to illuminate the content of Aboriginal title, they have an enormous impact on the sort
of title Aboriginal peoples will be able to assert. For example, these remarks signal a
powerful factor counter-balancing a naive or simplistic "exclusive right to land" vision
of Aboriginal title. Furthermore, the discussion of legislative infringement reveals detail
concerning the degree of land control the Supreme Court finds intertwined with the
concept of Aboriginal title. In examining the power that the governments of Canada
enjoy over Aboriginal lands, the power in the hands of Aboriginal peoples is thrown into
negative relief.
There is in Delgamuukw a complex, and at times confusing, discussion of the
sort of involvement required of, or reparation owed to, Aboriginal people adversely
affected by legislative infringement of the enjoyment of their title and associated
rights.26 In certain circumstances, for example, the consent of an Aboriginal party may
be required before government action is taken:
[A]boriginal title encompasses within it a right to choose to what ends a piece
of land can be put....There is always a duty of consultation....In most cases,
it will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even
require the full consent ofan [A]boriginal nation, particularly when provinces
enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to [A]boriginal lands. 27
Some might see this as significantly strengthening the pre-Delgamuukw
Aboriginal position, for depending on the Aboriginal right in question (i.e. a powerful
connection to a particular piece of land, of central importance to the people in question),
this might seem to necessitate obtaining consent before infringement can take place.
This remark must, however, be taken in the context of the Court's discussion
of the power of the Crown in relation to Aboriginal title. In this regard we must
consider the nature of the fiduciary duties the Crown must acknowledge in relation to
Aboriginal peoples and their lands, and the manner by which the Crown may properly
discharge these duties. It is fiduciary doctrine which structured the discussion of
infringement in Sparrow8 and Gladstone,29 cases which set out the Court's position on
the power of the Crown vis-a-vis constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights. Fiduciary
doctrine comes in to determine Crown duties, such that outside the circle inscribed by
Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary relationships, it is not clear that the Court would find the
Crown has any greater duty in regards to Aboriginal peoples than it has to any other
subset of the Canadian population. 0 It is in properly discharging fiduciary obligations
26 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1111-1114.
27 Ibid. at 1113 (emphasis added). Note the connection in this passage to "traditional
activities," those central to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal people in question.
28 Sparrow, supra note 2.
29 Gladstone, supra note 2.
30 Even Crown-Aboriginal treaties are approached by the Court through fiduciary
doctrine. See Adams, supra note 2; R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, 133 D.L.R. (4") 324.
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that the Canadian government can legitimize legislative action thatprimafacie infringes
the impugned Aboriginal right(s).
Before exploring how the Court deploys fiduciary doctrine in recent decisions,
a few words are in order concerning the general nature of the law of fiduciary relations,
and more specifically how it ought to apply in the Crown-Aboriginal context. A useful
analysis of the nature of Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary relationships is provided by
Leonard Rotman in Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native
Relationship in Canada.3
B. The Nature of Fiduciary Relationships
In Parallel Paths, Rotman eschews the common misconception of fiduciary
doctrine as "merely a set of loosely fitting or entirely unrelated rules functioning in an
ad hoc fashion," arguing instead for a theory which holds that fiduciary doctrine "....is
a blueprint for the protection and continued efficacy of interdependent societal
relations. 32
Along these lines Rotman argues for a functional, situation-specific approach.
To employ this approach is to engage a three-stage process: determining whether the
particular relationship under scrutiny is fiduciary in nature; subjecting a relationship so
characterized to the general principles of fiduciary doctrine; and applying the
appropriate remedy, should a breach be found.33
In the Crown-Aboriginal context, the first stage would depend on whether the
questionable activity was in relation to the general historic relationship between the
Crown and Canada's Aboriginal peoples, or based on a particular set of circumstances
surrounding the Crown and some particular Aboriginal people. We can limit discussion
to the general context, and leave the application to more particularized situations to the
natural extension of these comments and the investigation that would need to follow the
allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty in those narrower confines.
On a very general level, the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the
Crown and Canada's Aboriginal peoples is clear.34 This relationship, Rotman argues,
is based in the historic interaction between the two parties, a relationship on an
international evel.35 The relationship continued and evolved through the devolution of
31 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) [hereinafter Parallel Paths].
32 Ibid. at 199.
33 Ibid. at 177.
34 Of course the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of this fiduciary
relationship, and in Sparrow, supra note 2, noted that this relationship is constitutionally
entrenched in s. 35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982]: "The existing [A]boriginal and treaty
rights of the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."
Nevertheless, as Rotman notes, merely recognizing the existence of the relationship,
without specifying how the relationship came into existence, and the precise nature of this
relationship, does a great disservice. It leaves unanswered just those fundamental questions that
need to be resolved before progress can be made on the second two stages of the process of
applying fiduciary theory. See Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 204-205.
35 At the outset of the relationship there can be no doubt that the British Crown thought
of Aboriginal peoples as constituting nations. Furthermore, the relationship was formed between
unequals, for Aboriginal peoples were much more powerful than the visitors, and remained so for
quite some time. See Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 21-73 for an historical overview and
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power to the Canadian Crown, and exists today constitutionally entrenched in s. 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982.36 The relationship emerged as essentially fiduciary when
the Crown, as it became the fiduciary, began to take on, or "capture", power enjoyed by
Canada's Aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal peoples simultaneously became beneficiaries.
In this transfer ofpower is found the fountainhead of this general fiduciary relationship-
-all understanding must flow from complete appreciation of this movement.
Once a transfer of power is effectuated, four basic elements of any fiduciary
relationship can be articulated, each of which applies in the general Canadian-
Aboriginal context: (1) the fiduciary must have the ability to positively or negatively
affect the interests of the beneficiary; (2) the interests of the beneficiary--in the context
of the fiduciary relationship--can only be met through the actions of the fiduciary; (3)
the fiduciary has an obligation to act in the beneficiaries' best interests; and (4) the
beneficiary relies on the honesty, integrity, and fidelity of the fiduciary as it acts in the
beneficiaries' best interests.37
Given the existence of these elements of the relationship, the question then is
what doctrinal consequences follow. Referring to Hohfeld's influential work on the
nature of the law as "merely the description and enforcement of the bundle of rights and
duties that are possessed by the participants in various situations and which govern the
relationships that stem therefrom, 38 Rotman argues that "fiduciary doctrine creates a
situation whereby after beneficiaries' transfer of powers to their fiduciaries, certain
rights are bestowed on the beneficiaries, and concurrent obligations are imposed on their
fiduciaries to act in the former's best interests." 39 Tying together the obligations of the
fiduciary is a "common, core obligation pertaining to all fiduciaries within the scope of
their fiduciary positions.... to act in the best interests of their beneficiaries. 40
Whether or not a breach of the general fiduciary relationship has occurred in
any particular situation depends on the presence or lack of utmost good faith in the
actions of the fiduciary in relation to the prescribed interests of the beneficiaries. While
the fiduciary may enjoy some latitude in deciding the nature of the best interests of those
beneficiaries it serves, even those decisions must be subject to the requirement of good
faith.
C. Sparrow and Gladstone: Application ofFiduciary Doctrine to the Infringement
ofAboriginal Rights
analysis of the first few centuries of interaction, and the Supreme Court discussion in Sioui v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at 1052-53, 70 D.L.R. (4 th) 427 [hereinafter
Sioui quoted to S.C.R.]: "[We] can conclude from the historical documents that both Great
Britain and France felt that the Indian nations had sufficient independence and played a large
enough role in North America for it to be good policy to maintain good relations with them very
close to those maintained between sovereign nations... .This clearly indicates that the Indian
nations were regarded in their relations with the European nations which occupied North America
as independent nations. The papers of Sir William Johnson....demonstrate the recognition by
Great Britain that nation-to-nation relations had to be conducted with the North American
Indians."
36 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 34.
31 Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 178-179 (paraphrased).
" Ibid. at 180.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. at 181.
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The Sparrow decision laid the groundwork for the determination of legitimate
infringement of Aboriginal rights by legislative action.4' In that decision the Court
found that only "compelling and substantial" legislative objectives could legitimately
diminish the enjoyment of Aboriginal rights by an Aboriginal people.42 In particular,
the Court took the time to point out that "the public interest" is simply too vague and
broad an objective to stand up as justification for an infringing piece of legislation, or
a regulation falling thereunder.43
Structuring this determination is the Court's application of fiduciary doctrine.
In the landmark Guerin decision, the Court located a fiduciary relationship between the
Crown and the Musqueam, a relationship grounded in the transfer of control over
surrendered Musqueam land to the Crown, control which the Court argued must be
exercised in the best interests of the Musqueam.44 In Sparrow, the reasoning behind this
determination was extended beyond its application to the particular facts in the Guerin
decision. Fiduciary doctrine, in the mind of the Court, came to structure Crown-
Aboriginal relations in general.45
The evolution of the application of fiduciary doctrine continued in Gladstone,
as the Court pulled back from its earlier reluctance to countenance "public interest"
objectives, and took the position that balancing with public interests--essentially third
party interests--is precisely the sort of process that can be undertaken in determining the
appropriateness of potentially infringing governmental action." In Delgamuukw, the
Gladstone line of reasoning was followed and applied in the context of Crown
infringement of Aboriginal title.
A number of mysteries surround the Court's discussion of legislative
infringement in Delgamuukw. Besides the Court's mysterious finding that provincial
41 Sparrow, supra note 2.
42 ibid.
41 Ibid. at 1113: "We find the 'public interest' justification to be so vague as to provide
no meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the justification of a
limitation on constitutional rights."
4 Guerin, supra note 2.
45 Sparrow, supra note 2.
46 Gladstone, supra note 2 at 774. Problems with this development are explored in
Section III. F, below.
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activities could now legitimately infringe Aboriginal title,47 there is an air of mystery
41 The very sorts of "public interest" objectives that the Court presents as examples of
legitimate legislative goals are those that typically fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial
governments, governments that have traditionally been thought of as constitutionally limited in
relation to matters that effect Aboriginal peoples. This has been thought to be so especially on
reserve land (falling as this does clearly under the jurisdiction of the federal government by way
ofs. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App.
II, No.5, and since the court has gone so far as to equate Aboriginal interests in reserve land to
Aboriginal interests in land over which there exists a valid claim to Aboriginal title in Guerin,
supra note 2 at 379, this should be so in relation to much of the land which is the subject of
comprehensive land claims. Somewhat mysteriously, the court indicated otherwise in
Delgamuukw (for analysis and criticism see K. Wilkins, "Of Provinces and s. 35 Rights" (1999)
22 Dal. L.J. 1 at 185; J. Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis ofDelgamuukw v. British
Columbia" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537 [hereinafter "An Analysis of Delgamuukw"];
"Defining Aboriginal Title," supra note 21; N. Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and
Provincial Land and Resource Law: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998)
32 U.B.C.L.R. 317).
A number of commentators have argued that the only way out of this confusion is for
the Court to re-address the situation in the future, and in the course of their re-assessment uphold
the long-standing restriction on provincial power vis-a-vis Aboriginal lands. See "Defining
Aboriginal Title," supra note 21 at 24-25; and Wilkins, supra note 47.
The way out of this apparent conflict is not necessarily, however, to return to the
position that the federal government enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over all such lands. It is
possible to question the nature of the alignment of "lands reserved for Indians" with Aboriginal
title lands. While the Court has clearly held that the Aboriginal interest in reserve lands is the
same as the Aboriginal interest in Aboriginal title lands, it is, after all, the status of the land that
is at issue, not whether the Aboriginal interests are the same. The analysis should begin with a
determination of the status of the land.
One could argue that "lands reserved for Indians" are only those set aside in specific
provisions in treaties. Certainly there exists precedent stating otherwise, that "lands reserved for
Indians" is a broad category encompassing all land in Canada not yet free of the burden of
Aboriginal title by way of treaty. (This line of reasoning emanates from St. Catherine's Milling,
supra note 2 at 59. In discussing an argument advanced by the counsel for Ontario to the effect
that "the expression 'Indian reserves' was used in legislative language to designate certain lands
in which the Indians had, after the royal proclamation of 1763, acquired a special interest, by
treaty or otherwise, and did not apply to land occupied by them in virtue of the proclamation," the
Privy Council found that in s. 91 (24), "the words actually used are, according to their natural
meaning, sufficient to include all lands reserved, upon any terms or conditions, for Indian
occupation" (emphasis added).) Nevertheless, this would be a point the Court could retreat from.
Few would dispute the fact, for example, that it is odd to suppose that the federal government has
had, irrespective of over a century of provincial activity in British Columbia, exclusive
jurisdictional authority overmuch of the land falling within this province's borders. Furthermore,
this makes sense historically, for Aboriginal lands would, as pre-treaty lands, also be those lands
over which Aboriginal peoples had ownership rights prior to the assertion of Crown
sovereignty-indeed, prior to contact. Finally, very little needs to be conceptually modified, for:
(a) it makes little sense to hold that prior to the existence of a treaty Aboriginal lands could be 'set
aside', and (b) one could simply limit the notion of federal jurisdiction over this land to the ability
to remove the 'burden' of Aboriginal title, leaving both underlying Crown title, and broader
legislative authority, in the hands of the provinces.
This might appear to be a dangerous proposition to put forward, for it has commonly
been understood that the federal government ought to be the sole party with jurisdictional
authority over Aboriginal lands, since the provinces are more likely to disregard Aboriginal
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surrounding this apparent pull-back from the Sparrow approach.
We need only concern ourselves with the latter mystery. How is it that the
Crown, held by the Court to be in a fiduciary position vis-ji-vis Aboriginal rights-
holders, is licensed to determine courses of action potentially impacting on the rights of
these beneficiaries on the basis of measurements involving third party interests?
48
Exploring the mystery surrounding the Court's consideration of the power of
the Crown to infringe Aboriginal title requires an examination of the paragraphs leading
up to Lamer C.J.'s startling claim that:
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and
hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the
building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support
those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose
and, in principle, can justify the infringement of [A]boriginal title.4 9
The task is to work backwards. What are the "purposes" with which these
objectives are consistent? These purposes are connected to the "reconciliation of the
prior occupation of North America by [A]boriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown
sovereignty, which entails the recognition that 'distinctive [A]boriginal societies exist
within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic community."'5 While
the doctrine of reconciliation mentioned in this passage comes from Van derPeet,5 the
entailment comes from Gladstone.
The doctrine of reconciliation, as startling as it may be,52 now seems to underlie
most, if not all, of the major decisions in the area of Aboriginal law. It has emerged as
the principle which structures how the Court will now deal with all substantive questions
about Aboriginal rights (and Aboriginal title).53 The decision in Gladstone merely
shows how the use of this principle plays out when questions of infringement arise.
interests in land. This is, however, a misplaced concern. If the provinces were to have legislative
authority over Aboriginal title lands this would not put them in a position to disregard Aboriginal
interests in the lands-on the contrary, it would catch provincial governments in a web of
responsibilities and duties. The Supreme Court would be, effectively, placing the provinces with
such legislative authority in potentially onerous fiduciary positions. The real danger would be that
the fiduciary web would be tremendously weakened by a biased or reluctant Court. See L.
Rotman, "Hunting For Answers in a Strange Kettle of Fish: Unilateralism, Paternalism and
Fiduciary Rhetoric in Badger and Van der Peet" (1997) 8 Constitutional Forum 40 [hereinafter
"Hunting For Answers"]; Rudin, supra note 10.
48 Note that the mystery is not so much that the Court retreated from finding that the
public interest could be brought in by the Crown as an objective claimed to be suitably compelling
and substantial-after all, the only objection the Court raised to this is that the public interest is too
vague and broad, a matter that can be clarified and narrowed with appropriate attention to
detail-rather, the mystery is about the application of fiduciary doctrine in this manner. See
Parallel Paths, supra note 3 1.
49 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1111. The quote comes from Gladstone, supra note
2 at 774.
" Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1111 (emphasis in original).
51 Van der Peet, supra note 2.
12 See e.g. Barsh & Henderson, supra note 12; Parallel Paths, supra note 31.
13 See further discussions, below, in Sections III. D. and III. F.
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Since the element to be reconciled with Crown sovereignty is nothing more
than the priorpresence ofAboriginal peoples, and the prioritizing of Aboriginal interests
cannot be taken out of the context of the "broader, social, political and economic
community," the principle of reconciliation plays out in measures designed to integrate
the Aboriginal community into the greater community. For the Crown to satisfy its
fiduciary duties to Aboriginal peoples post-Gladstone, the Court requires no more than
efforts to work Aboriginal peoples into the greater social, political and economic life of
Canada. When Aboriginal title is considered, the conditions on the Crown crystallize
as requirements to attempt to include Aboriginal peoples in Crown authorized
operations on Aboriginal lands, efforts to inform decisions reached about such
operations with an Aboriginal input, and efforts to fairly compensate when the
Aboriginal use of Aboriginal land is economically impacted.
5 4
While the application of the principle of reconciliation explains the Court's
approval of "public interest" objectives as meeting the standard of "compelling and
substantial" put in place in Sparrow, it does not, however, succeed injustifying this
approval. On what basis can it be said that in the context of Aboriginal title the Crown
may legitimately infringe the enjoyment of this title when this enjoyment is measured
against "valid" third party interests? How can the Court's reasoning be reconciled with
fiduciary doctrine?
This question is even more pressing when we recall that Aboriginal rights have
been recognized and affirmed in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982:5 Would not the
constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights offer them protection from precisely this sort
of "weighing and balancing" with non-Aboriginal interests? After all, as McNeil
suggested, this constitutionalization should enhance what already seems to be a
significant form of land title. Clearly, we need to explore in ever more detail how the
Court understood fiduciary doctrine to play out in the Crown-Aboriginal context in
relation to Aboriginal title.
First, we take a more detailed look at the Court's recent ruminations on the
general nature of the fiduciary relationship holding between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples, and what this relationship demands of the Crown. The conceptualization of
this relationship is then examined in relation to the Court's application of this doctrine
to Aboriginal title.
D. Analysis of "Form" and "Degree of Scrutiny"
In Delgamuukw, the Court held that "the requirements ofthe fiduciary duty are
a function of the 'legal and factual context' of each appeal. 5 6 In Sparrow and
Gladstone this context dictated that the fiduciary duty be interpreted and applied "in
terms of the idea of priority. 57 The theory that informs discussions about priority,
' In Section III. F., below, the Court's ruminations on legislative infringement of
Aboriginal title are explored and critiqued in greater detail.
55 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 34.
56 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1108.
57 ibid. at 1108.
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Lamer C.J. noted, is that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples requires that Aboriginal interests be placed first. 8
Priority allocation, however, turned out not to be a simple matter, as Gladstone
demonstrated. While in Sparrow the alleged right was only for fishing for food
purposes, in Gladstone the alleged right was to a commercial scale fishery. The Court
could not sanction placing an Aboriginal fishery ahead of all other concerns (except
conservation), and avoided a simple priority allocation by devising a complex matrix
dependent on the "form" of the fiduciary duty and the "degree of scrutiny" that would
be demanded of the government legislation.
Sparrow had already seen the introduction of the notion that theform of the
fiduciary obligation could vary according to the "legal and factual context" of the
situation. The fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court held, could be articulated in different
ways, requiring, for example, that there be as little infringement as possible, that
compensation be on the table if the situation is one of appropriation, and that, if the
matter concerns decision-making which might adversely affect the alleged Aboriginal
right, consultation be carried out. 9
Gladstone added the notion that there could be variation in the degree of
scrutiny, variation which impacts on the manner by which the Crown prioritizes
Aboriginal interests that are in the mix with other concerns.6 Since the alleged right in
Gladstone was for a commercial fishery the Crown was held to a much lower standard
of scrutiny, and was only required to show that the potentially infringing actions reflect
prior Aboriginal interests-in effect ensuring that the allocation of any resources be
carried out respectfully. Far from demanding, then, that the Aboriginal interests be
placed at the penultimate position when interests are to be prioritized,6' this new
approach to spelling out conditions for satisfaction of the Crown's fiduciary duties only
requires that the Crown show respect for the fact that Aboriginal peoples were present
in Canada long before the Crown (and Canada) were part of the political landscape.62
These remarks do not, however, go fair enough in illuminating the dynamic of
the Crown-Aboriginal relationship. In particular, the question of the justification of the
Court's approval of 'public interest' objectives has still not been addressed
satisfactorily. We must continue to delve into the Court's reasoning. What, piecisely,
58 Ibid. at para. 1108. This would accord with the analysis of the Crown-Aboriginal
fiduciary relationship carried out by Rotman, in Parallel Paths, supra note 31. The relationship,
he argues, is grounded in the historic interactions between the Crown and Canada's Aboriginal
peoples (arising in both a general fiduciary relationship, insofar as the Crown has entered into a
broad relationship with the First Peoples of Canada, as evidenced by the Royal Proclamation, and
other general instruments such as the Constitution Acts; and particular fiduciary relationships,
insofar as the Crown has entered into agreements and relationships with particular Aboriginal
peoples over the last few centuries). Insofar as Aboriginal peoples have reposed their trust in the
integrity and honour of the Crown, trusting that the Crown will act in their best interests when
acting in relation to these interests, the result ought to be a policy of prioritizing Aboriginal
interests in the land (above all, that is, but such paramount concerns as conservation interests).
5 Sparrow, supra note 2.
6 Gladstone, supra note 2 at para. 62, noted in Delgamuukw, supra note I at 1110.
61 That is, the interest would follow valid conservation measures.
62 Consistent with the current treatment of Aboriginal rights, this discussion hinges
on the notion that the aim in contemporary jurisprudence must be to facilitate the reconciliation
of the prior presence of Aboriginal societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.
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are the "form" and "degree of scrutiny" of a fiduciary obligation, and how do these
impact on the nature of the duties befalling the Crown?
As we noted above, the Court pointed out in Delgamuukw that while in
Sparrow the articulation of the fiduciary duty had been carried out in terms of priority,
other interpretations of the duty would be possible in different contexts. The Court then
addressed the question of when differing modes of interpretation would be called for.
This, Lamer C.J. suggested, "will in large part be a function of the nature of the
aboriginal right at issue." 63
Lamer C.J. fleshed out this suggestion through a re-examination of the Court's
consideration of the notion of 'priority' in Gladstone. The key difference between the
sort of Aboriginal right at issue in Sparrow and the sort of Aboriginal right at issue in
Gladstone is that the former was "internally limited" (being a claim to a right to fish for
food, ceremonial and social purposes), while the latter had no such internal limit (being
a claim to a commercial fishery, only limited externally, by matters of supply and
demand). This difference in the sort of Aboriginal right claimed "demanded," then, that
the Court reinterpret the notion of priority, so that when this notion is employed in the
context of determining the fiduciary obligations of the Crown, it does not have the
consequence of forcing the Crown to recognize an Aboriginal "exclusive right to exploit
the fishery on a commercial basis."'
But what is the ground for this demarcation of Aboriginal rights according to
whether or not they have internal limits? According to Lamer C.J., it "was not the
intention of Sparrow"'65 to hold the Crown to a fiduciary duty to prioritize an Aboriginal
commercial fishery in the same manner as it was told to prioritize an Aboriginal
"personal" fishery. Why, however, was this not the intention?
The answer lies, once again, in the theory of reconciliation enunciated in Van
der Peet.66 We have already noted how this theory structured the reorganization of the
notion of the fiduciary relationship in Gladstone. The aim of s. 35(1), according to the
Court in Van der Peet, is limited to acknowledging the prior presence of Aboriginal
societies in Canada. Therefore, this section of the Constitution is to be used to reconcile
the sovereignty of the Crown with this prior presence. What this implies about the
contemporary position of Canada's Aboriginal peoples can be summed up in one pithy
phrase: "distinctive [A]boriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader
social, political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign."'67
So long as the impugned Aboriginal right is one which does not threaten to
directly conflict with the interests of other elements of the "broader social, political and
economic community" within which Aboriginal peoples find themselves, the right is to
be taken quite seriously by the Crown. As the fiduciary, they are held to a high standard
of conduct, and are instructed by the Court to prioritize this Aboriginal interest above
all but "compelling and substantial" legislative objectives. On the other hand, should
the impugned Aboriginal right be one which threatens to come into direct conflict with
other legitimate interests of other elements ofthe "broader social, political and economic
community," the right is not one which the Court will ask the Crown to prioritize in this
63 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1109.
64 Ibid.at llO.
65 Ibid.
66 Van der Peet, supra note 2.
67 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1107.
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simple manner. Rather, the Crown will only be held to the task of "respecting" the
Aboriginal interest as it works toward fulfilling its general obligations to this greater
community.6
8
1. Delgamuukw: Application of Fiduciary Doctrine to the
Infringement of Aboriginal Title
The Court inDelgamuukw applied this complex matrix ofvarying "forms" and
"degrees of scrutiny" to the question of the infringement of Aboriginal title. The result,
as was hinted at earlier, is a startling transformation of Aboriginal title from what one
might initially think is a fairly strong form of land ownership to what is in actuality an
exceedingly weak grade of title. One key to this, as should be clear from the above
discussion, is the categorization ofAboriginal title as a class of Aboriginal rights lacking
an internal limit.69 Ironically, the very characterization of Aboriginal title as a right to
the exclusive use and occupation of land comes on the scene to strip Aboriginal title of
most of its force.
In addition to the exclusivity of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J. found two other
aspects of Aboriginal title which effect the form of, and scrutiny attached to, the
fiduciary duties of the Crown: the right to choose the ends to which the land can be put,
and an inescapable economic component to this title.70 These aspects also go into
structuring the particular legal and factual context, and since they too encompass rights
which might come into direct conflict with the interests of others within the broader
community, they result in the Crown being called upon to prioritize Aboriginal interests
in ways which only reflect the priority of these interests.
In light of the exclusivity of Aboriginal title, the Crown may have to work to
include the affected Aboriginal peoples in the operations it wishes to advance or
promote. In Gladstone, this was spelled out in terms of boosting Aboriginal
participation in the overall fishery. We can imagine that in relation to Aboriginal title
this might spell out, for example, in efforts to include Aboriginal peoples in forestry
operations where these might impact on tracts of Aboriginal title land. In light of the
Aboriginal right to choose the ends to which the land can be put, the Crown may have
to either consult with, or even seek the consent of, the Aboriginal peoples potentially
affected by the contemplated legislative action. We might imagine that this would spell
out, to return to the same example, in efforts to reach agreements over forestry
operations before licensing these activities, agreements that attempt to take Aboriginal
interests into account. Finally, in light of the third aspect of title, the Crown may have
to compensate Aboriginal peoples for actions on its part, or which it facilitates, which
negatively impact on the economic enjoyment of the land by the Aboriginal peoples in
question.
The result is a framework which tells us much about the nature of Aboriginal
title as it can be exercised by Aboriginal title-holders. Put quite simply, Aboriginal
68 This accounts for the manner by which the Crown must "grant priority" in the
situation of an Aboriginal right lacking an internal limit. See the list of questions appropriate to
this situation listed in Gladstone, supra note 2 at para. 64, and quoted by Lamer C.J. in
Delgamuukw, ibid. at 1110.
69 Delgamuukw, ibid. at 1112: "The exclusive nature of [A]boriginal title is relevant
to the degree of scrutiny of the infringing measure or action."
70 Ibid. at 1112.
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peoples are restricted from exercising their rights to their lands to those uses which are
"internally limited" should they wish to do so free of interference from the Crown.
When they wish to step outside these sorts of uses, the actual power to determine the
extent to which they can thereby use the land is in the hands of the fiduciary, the Crown,
who determines the appropriateness of such activities in relation to the other "valid"
interests of other "historic" users of this land (and even in light of the interests of others
who might only now wish to come on this land to exploit its resources). While
Aboriginal title-holders have a right to the exclusive use and occupation of Aboriginal
title lands, the existence of the fiduciary relationship entails that control over the
exercise of this right is by and large in the hands of the Crown.
At the end of the analysis, when the complete picture of Aboriginal title is
before us, what might seem to have been a strong form of title, a title defined in terms
of a right to the exclusive use and occupation of land, turns out to be a very peculiar
form of title. While one might naturally surmise that such a right would
straightforwardly encompass a certain degree of control over the land in question, the
Court deploys fiduciary doctrine to fix the locus of direct control in the Crown. What
is most startling, however, is the lack of any form of "control", indirect or otherwise,
that Aboriginal title-holders actually enjoy, as Aboriginal title is subject to vast and
sweeping powers of the Crown acting to further the interests not only of the
beneficiaries, but of others within the broader community.
2. Problems with the Doctrine of Crown Fiduciary Obligations in
Relation to Aboriginal Lands
The amount of land control actually in the hands of Aboriginal title-holders
seems to be unduly limited. Why, as land owners, do Aboriginal peoples not have the
sorts of powers, vis-it-vis their lands, that non-Aboriginal title-holders enjoy? The
simple response is that they ought to enjoy, in the least, commensurate powers. The
reason why they do not enjoy these sorts of powers lies buried in the very elements of
Delgamuukw we have explored-in particular, in both the theoretical development of
fiduciary doctrine pulled out of Gladstone, and the subsequent application of this variant
of fiduciary doctrine to Aboriginal title.7
Problems, however, swirl around this outcome, problems which can be
classified as simultaneously conceptual and "political". While the more fundamental
problem lies in the peculiar development of fiduciary doctrine in Gladstone, we will
explore these problems by first exploring how this variant was applied in Delgamuukw.
Problems centering on the Court's misconstrual of fiduciary doctrine in the Crown-
Aboriginal context will be explored in the final section, as we look to alternative
pathways to mending deep colonial wounds. Since the application of fiduciary doctrine
is inextricably intertwined with colonialism, it should be discussed in that context.
We can focus on two problems in the deployment of fiduciary doctrine in
Delgamuukw. On the one hand the Court conceived of the fiduciary relationship arising
out of contemporary Aboriginal title in a limited and unsatisfactory manner. On the
other hand, the Court continued in its "protectionist" approach to Aboriginal issues in
its application of fiduciary doctrine, once again revealing that it is not yet capable of
"' The ensuing discussion is premised on the suitability of applying fiduciary doctrine
to the situation. Naturally, other options are available.
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leaving behind its "Aboriginality" conceptualization of Aboriginal rights and title. We
consider these problems in turn.
If we are to imagine Aboriginal peoples in Canada as having entered a
relationship in which they have reposed trust in the Crown, in relation to the lands to
which they were formerly sole possessors, we must be clear about what power has been
transferred and what is now demanded of the fiduciary. The pre-existence of Aboriginal
legal systems was acknowledged by the Court in Delgamuukw7 2 (if only to serve a fairly
minor purpose in establishing title).73 These legal systems structured the relationships
between Aboriginal communities and their lands, and in most, if not all, situations
would have provided for a measure of exclusivity over traditional territories. A
fiduciary is forbidden from acting in its own interests when acting on behalf of the
beneficiaries to the relationship.74 To allow this to happen would be to undercut entirely
the theory underlying fiduciary doctrine, for it would destroy any possibility of the
beneficiary reposing trust in the fiduciary. Only if it is clear that forbidding fiduciary
self-interest is a requirement universally and absolutely imposed can the context for trust
be developed. The mandate of the fiduciary is crystal clear-to act in the interests of the
beneficiaries when deploying power(s) conferred to it at the establishment of the
fiduciary relationship.
The Crown cannot, then, treat Aboriginal title as the Court suggests it may. If
we are to make sense ofthe existence of a fiduciary relationship between the Crown and
Canada's Aboriginal peoples in relation to Aboriginal land, we must imagine that the
latter peoples have transferred power over their lands to the former entity. The sort of
power transferred is clear, and the duty of the Crown is therefore likewise unambiguous.
To suggest, simply because the Aboriginal parties transferred a substantial form of title,
that the fiduciary is now in a position to devalue the interests of its beneficiaries, is quite
plainly ludicrous. Why, one must ask, would the Aboriginal parties have ever entered
into such a relationship? Is this how their trust is rewarded?
Some might argue that when the Crown is in a fiduciary relationship it is
forbidden from acting in its own behalf,75 but that it must, in certain circumstances,
weigh and balance between conflicting duties.76 It may have a duty to other elements
72 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1082.
71 While Aboriginal legal systems only serve to show the extent of exclusivity lying
within a claim to title, they are implicitly introduced whenever the Aboriginal perspective is
mentioned and when the Court discusses the notion of an inherent limit.
4 Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 149-99.
75 See e.g. Krugerv. R. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4h) 591 at 607, [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 15 at
75 (C.A.). In this case, it was found that the Department of Indian Affairs was trying to work in
the best interests of the Penticton Indian Reserve No. 1, but that this Department ran head on into
the Department of Transport, which wanted reserve land in the interests of air transport. As Heald
J. noted: "[T]he federal Crown was in a conflict of interest in respect of its fiduciary relationship
with the Indians. The law is clear that '. . .one who undertakes a task on behalf of another must
act exclusively for the benefit of the other, putting his own interests completely aside' and that
'Equity fashioned the rule that no man may allow his duty to conflict with his interest."'
76 Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 18: "[T]here may be circumstances in which the
Crown's fiduciary duty to Aboriginal peoples conflicts with its other responsibilities, such as the
interest of the public at large. Where such potential conflict of interest situations exist, the Crown
cannot simply ignore one interest in favour of the other. Rather, it must attempt to balance its
competing responsibilities."
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of society (again, the "broader community" enters the discussion), and it may, then,
have to weigh off against this its fiduciary responsibilities to Aboriginal title-holders.
There are several problems, however, with this argument. Both rest on bearing
in mind the nature of the power transferred. First, complicating the situation is the fact
that the fiduciary relationship captures not only transfer of certain ownership interests
from Canada's Aboriginal peoples to the Crown, but the transfer of both interests in
enjoying this land and control over this land.77 If, then, we are to conceive of the
relationship as fiduciary in nature, we must hold the Crown to exercising control over
this land in the interests of Aboriginal title-holders.
With the admission of the nature ofAboriginal title as encompassing a right to
the exclusive use and occupation of land, and its deployment of fiduciary language in
the context of Aboriginal title, the Court has committed itself to the view that Aboriginal
peoples must be seen as transferring control over their lands to the Crown. In light of
the sort of interest in the hands of the Crown, this precludes the Crown from doing as
it might be licensed in other situations wherein a fiduciary duty conflicted with other
responsibilities. Any other responsibilities it might have to those in the "greater
community" are necessarily separate from those it owes Aboriginal title-holders-it
simply cannot "weigh and balance" between these separate sets.
Second, it must be borne in mind that the historic interaction that created the
fiduciary relationship is of a radically different kind from that commonly considered in
relation to fiduciary doctrine. We must remain cognizant of the political context at
issue, for neither the Crown nor the Aboriginal peoples were 'private' parties to the
relationship established through the transfer of control over Aboriginal lands.
Furthermore, in this historic movement the Crown did not take on itself the task of
acting in the best interests of certain of its subjects. We are contemplating the
establishment of a relationship between a sovereign entity and communities that are,
prior to the establishment of the fiduciary relationship, outside thepolitical community
lying under this authority.78
If we put these two points together, we can appreciate the reason for separating
Aboriginal interests in the land from those of other "valid" third party interests:
Aboriginal title-holders have, if we accept the fiduciary picture, transferred their
capacity to fundamentally govern their lands.79 In this context, when there is a conflict
between acting to further Aboriginal interests and meeting other Crown responsibilities,
Aboriginal interests cannot be weighed and balanced "in the mix." This is simply not
77 Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 12. McNeil points out that in defining
Aboriginal title as encompassing a right to the exclusive use and occupation of land, the Court has
acknowledged that a notion of a substantial degree of control over the uses of land resides within
the very concept of this title. Note also the judgment of Williamson J. in Campbell v. British
Columbia (AG) (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4') 333, 79 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122 (S.C.) at para 114: "On the
face of it, it seems that a right to aboriginal title, a communal right which includes occupation and
use, must of necessity include the right of the communal ownership to make decisions about that
occupation and use, matters commonly described as governmental functions. This seems essential
when the ownership is communal."
78 Sioui, supra note 35 at 1052.
71 See Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 12 and "An Analysis of Delgamuukw,"
supra note 47.
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how Aboriginal peoples, if the powers transferred were returned, would settle such
conflicts.80
It is difficult to say what led the Court into making the mistake of supposing
that the Crown could weigh and balance Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests in the
land as it goes about deciding how best to satisfy the interests of the beneficiaries. One
might suggest that rather than consider that Aboriginal control over territory has been
transferred, the Court has simply ignored this transfer, for only by ignoring this aspect
of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship could the Court find that Aboriginal interests in
their lands could be weighed and balanced "in the mix." This would seem to fly in the
face of the remarks in Delgamuukw on the duties owed by the Crown in light of the
nature of Aboriginal title as encompassing an exclusive right to use and occupy
traditional lands, but finds some support in the fact that the Court is always quite careful
to avoid suggesting that Aboriginal peoples ever constituted sufficiently formed
sovereign entities to have had anything approaching governance rights over their lands.
The second conceptual problem with fiduciary doctrine as it is employed in
Delgamuukw concerns the continued presence of the doctrine of"Aboriginality." This
doctrine surfaces in the distinction drawn between Aboriginal rights internally limited
and Aboriginal rights lacking such limits. It was noted earlier that the only possible
rationalization for this distinction lies in the desire of the Court to circumvent situations
wherein it might seem called upon to force legislatures to treat those Aboriginal interests
potentially impacting on third party interests in a "special" manner.8 '
What this distinction effectively accomplishes, however, is the limitation of full
protection for Aboriginal rights to those practices internal to the culture- the very same
practices protected under the Van derPeet test, frozen at the time of contact.8 2 Not only
does this make the scope of protected rights narrow (in relation to land), it cuts to the
core of Aboriginal autonomy. Aboriginal peoples, to continue to be recognized as
peoples with interests constitutionally protected, are forced by this doctrine to fit within
a construction imposed by the Court."' Any attempt to advance interests which go
beyond age-old measures to provide for subsistence, ceremony, or community use, is
met with the power of the Crown to weigh these interests with other, third-party,
concerns. The "squeeze" is on, for limiting claims to those rights which have inherent
internal limits does little to forestall foreign intrusions on traditional territories, intrusion
authorized by the Crown up to the point it interferes with the ability of the Aboriginal
people to meet these internal community needs.8 4
" In many cases this may not be a reliable means of assessing the actions of the
fiduciary, but in this context it is more than sufficient. Some might suggest that Aboriginal
peoples, given a general adherence to principles of sharing, would place their own interests "in
the mix" with those of the others. But this would be situation-specific, and in the modem context,
with the interests impacting on Aboriginal interests threatening to overwhelm Aboriginal
communities, this is unlikely. Regardless, the notion of "sharing" would have to be understood
from the Aboriginal perspective.
" It might be able to excuse, if not justify, such reasoning by studying the "dialogue"
that takes place between the Crown and the Supreme Court. See Rudin, supra note 10 at 81.
82 Van der Peet, supra note 2 at 548.
83 See e.g. "An Analysis of Delgammukw," supra note 47 at 549.
8 Actually the intrusion can go far beyond this, so long as the Crown is prepared to
compensate the Aboriginal title-holders for the economic component of their title.
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This completes the exploration into the nature of Aboriginal title, notably as
it relates to the power of Aboriginal title-holders to control the uses to which the land
might be put. Undoubtedly, the Court will have much more to say about the nature of
Aboriginal title, especially with the numerous loose ends remaining,"5 and given the fact
that what it does say in Delgamuukw can be classified as obiter.
Nonetheless, it is clear which direction the Court has struck out on. Aboriginal
title is shaping up to be quite peculiar. Superficially, it seems to signal a step forward
in the struggle to find an appropriate place for Aboriginal peoples in the contemporary
world, for it would seem to recognize the strength of the claims to land control that
Aboriginal peoples unquestionably enjoy. When viewed in light of both the conceptual
and practical limits to its deployment, however, Aboriginal title deflates, becoming little
more than a weak claim to continue to enjoy traditional activities in relation to the land,
as much as they can over depleted and devastated lands. Of greatest concern is the
location of power, vis-a-vis the land, in the Crown. Since the Court has conceived of
the proper exercise of this power in such a manner as to ensure that Aboriginal
responsibilities are thrown into the hopper with other interests in the use of the land, the
capacity of Aboriginal peoples to meet these responsibilities seems completely undercut.
Hope for Aboriginal peoples clinging to their unique title claims must be
placed on appealing to the integrity of the Court, asking that it reconsider its peculiar
treatment of fiduciary doctrine in Gladstone.
IV. DRAwING OUT THE THREADS, AND WEAVING A PROPOSAL
Under the doctrine of Aboriginal title developed in Delgamuukw, Aboriginal
peoples find themselves trapped with a weak form of land ownership. Understandably
a great deal of confusion will ensue, as the reader of the judgment can quite easily come
away with the notion that the Supreme Court has found a substantial form of title, one
on which Aboriginal peoples could immediately rely as they position themselves in the
modem world. As Aboriginal peoples find that the title to which they can lay claim can
only be accessed through the Crown, where access can be limited as the Crown
measures its duties as fiduciary against other "valid" interests in the land, undoubtedly
Aboriginal title-holders will be driven to bargain away their deep spiritual connections
to the land with agreements designed to maximize economic opportunity. In a highly
suspect move, indeed a move with all the markings of a colonial maneuver, the Court
has apparently none-too-gently pushed Aboriginal title-holders toward complete
immersion in the non-Aboriginal world.
This should not, however, be the fate of Aboriginal title-holders, especially
under the flag of fiduciary doctrine. Fiduciary doctrine as it applies in the context of
Crown-Aboriginal relationships ought to be strengthened, not haphazardly, but in line
with the underlying principles of strict fiduciary theory. This is at least one path open
in the quest to overcome the deficiencies of the Court's ruling on Aboriginal title.
Recognizing the value in protecting the "continued efficacy of interdependent
societal relations" 86 is not to condone imperialistic maneuvers. Avoiding sanctioning
5 See Hon. Mr. Justice D. Lambert, "Van DerPeet and Delgamuukw: Ten Unresolved
Issues" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 249 [hereinafter "Ten Unresolved Issues"] for a discussion of
some of the loose ends.
16 Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 199.
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this sort of maneuver under fiduciary doctrine is not only possible, it is demanded by
an appreciation of fiduciary theory, and its proper application. The historic interactions
between Aboriginal title-holders and the Crown can be acknowledged as generating a
fiduciary relationship. One can conceive of the control of Aboriginal land interests as
being transferred from the title-holders to the Crown, and the exercise of this control
conceived of as placing the Crown in the role of fiduciary. Once, however, the true
nature of the power transferred is acknowledged, and the interests of the Aboriginal
title-holders properly understood, the fiduciary duties on the Crown would be vastly
different from those enunciated in Delgamuukw, and Aboriginal title-holders would
enjoy the protection of their interests to which they are entitled. In particular,
potentially infringing legislative activity going beyond the strict limits set by fiduciary
doctrine, directed toward fundamental Aboriginal interests, would be subject to
powerful Aboriginal challenges.
A. Overcoming Gladstone
As we explored the distinction drawn in Gladstone (between Aboriginal rights
with internal limits and those lacking such limits), judicial explanations were
forthcoming, but ultimately no justification for drawing this distinction could be found.
Is it possible to find within fiduciary theory justification for the schism introduced in
Gladstone, that between Aboriginal rights having or lacking "internal limits"? Is it
possible that fiduciary theory could condone the lowering of requirements on a fiduciary
on the basis of the potential interaction of the beneficiaries' enjoyment of their rights
and the interests of third parties?
One might argue that the Court was simply trying to find that balance between
the competing obligations of the Crown, for the governments of Canada must try to
satisfy their competing obligations toward Aboriginal peoples and the general
population. This matter was canvassed earlier. There is no licence to be found here for
either the lessening or absolution of Crown fiduciary obligations (especially, one might
suppose, when these are constitutionally entrenched). And yet this is what the
construction in Gladstone would seem to ordain, for the lower demands on thfe Crown
vis-h-vis Aboriginal claims lacking internal limits would seem to require of the Crown
no more than that it treat Aboriginal peoples as one stake-holder amongst a community
of stake-holders. With this lowering of the demands on the Crown, Aboriginal peoples
do not find their interests "balanced" in any manner which suggests that the Crown is
in a fiduciary position based on historic Crown-Aboriginal interactions. Rather, the
fiduciary relationship is undercut, and replaced with nothing more than that we might
suppose exists between any liberal democratic government and a sub-set of its
population.
To be blunt, then, this distinction rests-conceptually speaking-on thin air.
Political considerations can make sense of this move, but such considerations ought to
have no place in fiduciary law. The fact that an impugned Aboriginal right without an
internal limit might potentially impact on the activities of other resource users or land
owners cannot act to seriously lower the bar for the fiduciary. The only conceptual link
that exists is to the doctrine of"Aboriginality," for this distinction functions to limit the
full exercise of Aboriginal rights to those that are internal to the community, which
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means, effectively, the sorts of rights that have been found to be integral to the distinct
culture of the people in question.
As we noted in discussing problems with the Court's treatment of the
Gladstone approach, the manner by which the approach is applied in Delgamuukw is
equally questionable, for the process of application serves to radically limit the
effectiveness of Aboriginal title, in effect reducing its impact on the contemporary world
to (at most) an increase in the economic claim of Aboriginal title-holders. Rather than
have a simple recognized right to the exclusive use and occupation of traditional
territories, Aboriginal title-holders find themselves, as holders ofsuigeneris title, forced
to challenge the Crown to justify infringing their rights, where the remedy is, for the
most part, economic. Any control over their land that would reflect that enjoyed on the
basis of their historic occupation is lost, replaced with an anemic capacity to push the
Crown to "consider" their interests, and possibly compensate them for economic loss.
This illustrates anothermajor flaw in the Court's approach to fiduciary doctrine
in the Canadian-Aboriginal context. The conflict of interest between the Crown acting
in its most general capacity and the Crown acting as a fiduciary in relation to Canada's
Aboriginal peoples cannot be ignored or downplayed. The courts must acknowledge
this profound conflict, and deal with it from within fiduciary doctrine. It is not open to
the courts to tinker with the underlying theory, attempting, as it were, to subvert equity
(and thereby leading to suspicions that the courts are not capable of acting in a fair and
objective manner).8"
Readjusting the fiduciary doctrine propounded in Gladstone rests on a
relatively simple (and, one might suppose, incontrovertible) initial maneuver. The
Crown must be held to the normal constraints imposed on fiduciaries, and held to the
sorts of remedies that would normally befall a finding of breach of the duties of such a
fiduciary. 89
87 This is not, then, really a matter of"Aboriginality" as it would be generally a matter
of "internality." Any society, limited to the full exercise of rights to those that have built in limits,
would be limited to rights which can only be exercised in the absence of other peoples. Hunting
and fishing for food or social purposes naturally fit this category.
88 As we noted earlier, the subversion of fiduciary doctrine can be seen in Gladstone,
supra note 2 at 730, when the Court considered the sorts of "compelling and substantial
objectives" that might justify the Crown in infringing Aboriginal rights. At this point the Court
introduced the underlying theory animating all Aboriginal rights post-Van der Peet, supra note
2: the theory of reconciliation between Crown sovereignty and the prior presence of Aboriginal
societies. See Gladstone, supra note 2 at 731 where the objectives condoned include "the pursuit
of economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and
participation in, the fishery by non-Aboriginal groups." However, how are we to make sense of
these as legitimate objectives? They are considerations that exist as the result of historic
infringement of Aboriginal rights. There would be no need to consider "regional fairness" or
"non-Aboriginal groups" if colonialism had not been the order of the day for generations. In its
historic fiduciary position the Crown has continuously breached its duties toward Canada's
Aboriginal peoples, and now the Court seems to be working within a white-washed version of this
relationship as it attempts to justify a continuing pattern of infringement and dispossession. That
the Supreme Court of the country can instigate such reasoning under the heading of fiduciary law
calls into serious question its objectivity. See generally Rotman, HuntingForAnswers, supra note
47.
89 See Hutchins, et al, "When Do Fiduciary Obligations To Aboriginal People Arise?"
(1995) 59 Sask L. R. 97 [hereinafter "When Do Fiduciary Obligations Arise?"].
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There are two keys to holding the Crown to its fiduciary obligations vis-,i-vis
Aboriginal peoples and their lands, even in light of its (sometimes) competing
obligations to Canadian society. First, the Crown must be held to better judgment in
determining the nature of Aboriginal interests in the land, and second, strict
prescriptions governing potential conflicts of interest must be addressed in this context.
In transferring (or losing) control and ownership over traditional territories Aboriginal
peoples did not automatically accept the Euro-Canadian vision of the nature and value
of the land. Both the governments of Canada and the courts of Canada are quite well
aware of the sort of interests Aboriginal peoples have in their traditional territories.90
To replace these interests with economic considerations is to disregard the fiduciary
relationship that arose on the transfer ofpower and control over these lands. In acting,
then, in matters which might impact on the exercise of Aboriginal interests in these
lands-that is, in relation to land distribution, transfer, use and development-the Crown
must be held to a simple strict standard of acting in the best interests of the Aboriginal
title-holders, as these interests are generally understood by the beneficiaries. Note that
this would apply as well to the context of treaty negotiations, requiring of the Crown
that it do its utmost to further the interests of the Aboriginal title-holders in reaching a
mutually acceptable agreement.
A movement back into line with strict fiduciary doctrine has the potential to
vest Aboriginal peoples with substantial-though indirect-control over their traditional
territories. So long as the Crown maintains its fiduciary role (and fiduciary doctrine
dictates that the Crown cannot unilaterally dispose of its obligations-consent of the
beneficiaries would be required),9' it is bound to act in the best interests of Aboriginal
title-holders. The Crown would be required to call upon the Aboriginal perspective in
determining the nature of these interests, for it is not in its power to determine these
unilaterally, especially when the wishes of the beneficiaries are known.92 Insofar as
Aboriginal peoples continue to profess the same sorts of interests in their lands as have
traditionally animated their cultures and societies, the Crown would be bound to work
toward furthering these interests in the contemporary world.93 Any sign of breach of
this duty would be occasion for the offended Aboriginal people to challenge the actions
of the Crown, calling on it to justify its actions in line with standard fiduciary principles
structuring both duties and the means by which duties can be met.
This would not substantially alter the determination of Aboriginal title from
Delgamuukw, and would continue to limit the ability of Aboriginal peoples to directly
determine the uses to which their traditional territories would be put. A delicate balance
could be achieved, however, for while control over these territories would be in the
90 The federal government struck a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The
Report of this Commission, RCAP, supra note 5, provides an invaluable educational resource.
Surely the government that asked for this Report, and the courts which have easy access, can
make use of it.
91 Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 190-195.
92 See e.g. Guerin, supra note 2.
9' Even without inviting the Aboriginal perspective into the discussion, the conflict
facing the Crown, and its abuse of this conflict, are clear. In Parallel Paths, supra note 31 at 271,
Rotman points out that "insofar as [the requirement of the Comprehensive Claim Process that
bands relinquish their Aboriginal rights in exchange for rights defined in claims settlements] does
not serve the best interests of the Aboriginal peoples, but acts to their detriment, this amounts to
a breach of the Crown's fiduciary duty."
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hands of the Crown, it would be held strictly accountable for all actions which might
impair the enjoyment of these lands by the title-holders.
1. Difficulties in the Way of Progress, and a Final Suggestion
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court appears to some to be under the sway of
"politics," an especially troublesome situation given the comments it has itself made
about the "honour" of the Crown. 94 Unless the Court can see its way to reinvoking clear
principled fiduciary theory in its handling of Crown-Aboriginal relations, it will pull
itself down in the eyes not only of Canada's Aboriginal peoples, but in the eyes of
Canadians in general and of peoples around the world.
Even if the Court reassessed its position in Gladstone, and reconsidered the
duties befalling the Crown as defined in Delgamuukw, the fact that fiduciary doctrine
operates under the auspices of the courts makes this approach to Aboriginal land control
less than optimal. Aboriginal peoples would have to trust in the ability of the courts to
continuously uphold their interests in their lands on those occasions when the Crown
apparently over-stepped its fiduciary position.95 It must be kept in mind that this would
require of the courts that they refrain from efforts to integrate Aboriginal communities
into the greater economy (as the approach of the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw would
have them do), and rather that they work to satisfactorily accommodate Aboriginal
peoples' desires to maintain their ways of life. Undoubtedly this would often require
that the courts seriously limit the Crown in its pursuit of the sorts of objectives Lamer
94 See, for example, numerous remarks in Sparrow, supra note 2 at 1109: "the concept
of holding the Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing with respect to the aboriginal
peoples of Canada is suggested by Guerin v. The Queen," and later, "[t]he way in which a
legislative objective is to be attained must uphold the honour of the Crown and must be in keeping
with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the Crown
and Canada's aboriginal peoples" (ibid. at 1110), and, "the honour of the Crown [is at stake] in
dealings with aboriginal peoples" (ibid. at 1079). Holding the Crown to such a standard, while
suspiciously appearing to the neutral observer to fall far short of the same, is not conscionable.
95 See Rudin, supra note 10, for an analysis of recent cases in Aboriginal law which
paints a fairly realistic picture of a dialogue between the Crown and courts, a dialogue which rests
on the perception of the courts that they cannot supercede the interests of the Crown, and that they
must respond with tempered judgments when the governments of Canada signal that they have
gone beyond what is politically acceptable.
A deeper explanation for this behaviour can be found in the analysis provided by Mary Ellen
Turpel, in "Home/Land" (1991) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 17. She argues at 19 that "the law functions
in a colonial context as the discourse which officially defines and sanctions political and social
'reality' for Aboriginal peoples." It must, however, be kept in mind, she continues, that "the law
is... subtle: sometimes it is clearly oppressive and, at other moments, it is murky" (ibid.).
Delgamuukw would be one of those murky moments, as the law presents itself as the "guardian
of those subject to it" (ibid.). Of course, in the larger picture, this is all presentation, carefully
crafted to maintain colonial hegemony.
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C.J. found to be legitimate in Delgamuukw. 6 Whether the courts would be able to
maintain this position is questionable.
Finally, as operated in conjunction with the courts this approach would carry
with it the high costs associated with litigation strategies. Even should successful
deployment ofthe courts transfer legal costs to the Crown, the time and energy involved
would be substantial.97
As a final suggestion, by no means made in jest, it might be argued that the
problem of having what ought to be an independent judicial process (that of grappling
with fundamental questions concerning Aboriginal title) becoming entangled in
"political" considerations can best be addressed by having the Supreme Court consider
whether the Canadian judicial system is in a fiduciary position vis-ii-vis the legal
interests of Canada's Aboriginal peoples. Should it be acknowledged to be in such a
position, should it acknowledge a sequence of historic events encompassing the transfer
of legal authority from Aboriginal nations to the Canadian state, a transfer which
reposed Aboriginal trust in the legal machinery of the Canadian state, the result would
be a fiduciary relationship between the Canadian judiciary and Canada's Aboriginal
peoples, the consequences of which would be most interesting.
V. CONCLUSION
As this line of analysis has shown, the complete picture of Aboriginal title
offered in Delgamuukw, one which includes the Court's discussion on the power of the
Crown to infringe enjoyment of this title, rests on underpinnings which make the entire
picture conceptually unstable and generally unacceptable (the Court's creation,
Aboriginal title in Canadian law, is questionable both on moral and doctrinal grounds,
and unacceptable in the eyes of Aboriginal peoples interested in preserving their
spiritual connections to lands they conceive of as placed in their hands by the Creator).
The doctrinal inconsistencies and ad hoc assumptions and arguments will inevitably
carry over into future jurisprudence, perpetuating instability for years to come. The
break between various pronouncements in Delgamuukw and principles ofjustice and
morals (especially in relation to the "spin" on fiduciary doctrine carried over from
Gladstone) will motivate ceaseless criticism, and prove fertile ground for charges of
racism,judicial bias and politicalization. Finally, the characterization ofAboriginal title
which makes it by and large ineffectual will be entirely unsatisfactory in the eyes of
title-holders, for they have an interest not so much in releasing their claims to most of
their territory in treaties, but in meeting their responsibilities in relation to the land to
which they are inextricably connected. This feeling of dissatisfaction cannot help the
governments of Canada as they strive to achieve "certainty."
96 As we see with the Innu and Northern Cree, for example, the development of
hydroelectric projects would have the sort of detrimental impact on traditional ways of life that
would likely make approval of this activity unjustifiable: see "When Do Fiduciary Obligations
Arise?," supra note 89. If this infringing activity were to be justifiable some sort of compromise,
other than merely attempting to pull the flooded-out peoples into the project or offering financial
compensation, would have to be worked out.
97 Absent a strengthening and revitalization ofthe injunction strategy the time element
could frustrate Aboriginal title-holders trying to prevent infringing activity from undercutting their
ways of life today.
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